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Case No. 20101031-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Barton V. McFarland,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals his sentencing for one count of forgery, a third degree
felony, and one count of providing false information to a police officer, a class A
misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4103(2)(e) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Issue. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Defendant to
prison, rather than probation, where Defendant pleaded guilty to two separate
crimes, Defendant has a long history of criminal behavior, and Defendant has
already served prison time in a prior case?
Standard of Review. "The trial court has substantial discretion in conducting
sentencing hearings and imposing a sentence, and we will in general overturn the

trial court's sentencing decisions only if we find an abuse of discretion/' State v.
Patience, 944 R2d 381,389 (Utah App. 1997) (quotations and citations omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules in this
case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CASE
On June 10, 2010, Defendant was found inside a motel room with several
hypodermic needles, a glass pipe with white residue on it, two small baggies with a
"leafy substance" inside, an electronic scale, and a stolen checkbook.
Defendant initially provided a false name to officers.

R. 1.

R. 1.

Upon further

questioning, Defendant admitted that he had already forged the owner's signature
on one of the checks and then used it. R. 1. At the time, Defendant had two
outstanding warrants for his arrest. R. 1.
Defendant was charged with one count of providing false information to a
police officer, a class A misdemeanor, one count of possessing drug paraphernalia, a
class B misdemeanor, one count of possessing a controlled substance (marijuana), a
class B misdemeanor, one count of possessing stolen property, a class B
misdemeanor, and one count of forgery, a third degree felony. R. 4-5.

2

Defendant accepted a plea deal from the State. R. 28-29. Under its terms,
Defendant pleaded guilty to the charges of providing false information to a police
officer and forgery; in exchange, the State dismissed the remaining three charges. R.
28-29; 58:2. The State also agreed to recommend (1) concurrent sentences, and (2) a
402 reduction on the forgery charge upon successful completion of probation. R. 2829; 58: 2.
AP&P filed a presentence investigation report (PSI) before sentencing. R. 38
(hereinafter PSI:

). The report detailed Defendant's criminal history, which

included multiple convictions for disorderly conduct, multiple convictions for
assault, and individual convictions for public intoxication, theft, criminal mischief,
and retail theft. PSI: 5-7.
The PSI also noted that in April 2004, Defendant had been convicted of a
federal firearm charge, for which he had served "21 months in federal prison/'
followed by 36 months' parole. PSI: 6. In addition, Defendant had been charged
with two drug charges in Montana in March 2008; those charges had never been
resolved, and there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest for these offenses in
Montana. PSI: 7. Finally, Defendant had an outstanding warrant for his arrest on a
class B misdemeanor in Box Elder County for violating port of entry weight
requirements. PSI: 7.
3

With respect to Defendant's probation history, the PSI noted that he had been
placed on probation in April 2004 following his conviction for criminal mischief and
assault, but that he had been unsuccessfully terminated from that probation and
ordered to serve 180 days in jail. PSI: 8. The PSI also noted that after serving 21
months in federal prison, he had violated his federal probation and served an
additional six months in prison after being apprehended. PSI: 8.
Defendant was sentenced in this case on November 22,2010. R. 39-40. At the
outset of the hearing, defense counsel acknowledged Defendant's "involve[ment]
with the federal system" and his state criminal record, but argued that because his
state history only involved misdemeanors, the court should give him probation with
a jail term. R. 59: 2.
The court then asked the prosecutor why he had agreed to a 402 reduction in
the plea bargain, given that Defendant had an "extensive criminal history" and had
already served time in prison. R. 59: 3. The prosecutor admitted that he had not
realized that Defendant had served time in federal prison, and said that if he had, he
would not have agreed to a 402 reduction. R. 59:4. After informing Defendant that
he would not grant a 402 reduction in this case, the court offered to allow him to
"withdraw his plea if that's what he would like to do." R. 59: 5.
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Before responding, Defendant asked the court what his sentence would be if
he reaffirmed his plea, stating that he hoped to receive "time served with possible
probation." R. 59: 5. The court responded that because of Defendant's "extensive
criminal history, including a prison commitment," the court thought this was "a
prison case." R. 59:5-6. Following a short consultation with his attorney, Defendant
agreed to go forward with sentencing. R. 59: 7.
The court then allowed Defendant and his counsel to speak regarding the
appropriate sentence. R. 59:7-8. Both argued that because Defendant's prior record
involved only misdemeanors, probation—not prison—was warranted. R. 59: 8. In
response, the State argued that because Defendant had committed these crimes after
having already served time in federal prison, the court should sentence him to
prison. R. 59: 9.
At that point, Defendant interjected with additional detail about his federal
sentence. He acknowledged that he had served time in federal prison and that he
had violated his federal probation. R. 59: 10. But Defendant disputed AP&P's
account of the violation.

According to Defendant, the violation had been a

"miscommunication" with his parole officer about where he was living. R. 59:10.
On questioning from the court, Defendant denied absconding from federal
supervision. R. 59:11.
5

After hearing these arguments, the court concluded that its "decision earlier"
to order prison was still "the right one." R. 59: 11. It accordingly sentenced
Defendant to 0-5 years in prison on the forgery charge and 365 days in jail on the
charge of providing false information to a police officer. R. 59:11.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Defendant to
prison, rather than probation. Defendant pleaded guilty to two separate criminal
counts. Moreover, Defendant is a repeat offender who has failed to comply with
probation conditions in the past. Under these circumstances, it was not inherently
unfair for the court to sentence Defendant to prison instead of probation.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN
IT SENTENCED DEFENDANT TO PRISON RATHER THAN
PROBATION
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced
him to jail rather than probation. Aplt. Br. 6-16.
A "defendant is not entitled to probation, but rather the [trial] court is
empowered to place the Defendant on probation if it thinks that will best serve the
ends of justice and is compatible with the public interest." State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d
1048,1051 (Utah App. 1991). "The granting or withholding of probation involves
6

considering intangibles of character, personality and attitude/'

Id. at 1049

(quotations and citation omitted).
An appellate court reverses a sentencing decision only when it is "clear that
the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute an abuse of
discretion/' Id. at 1051 (quotations and citation omitted). This occurs if "the actions
of the judge in sentencing were inherently unfair or if the judge imposed a clearly
excessive sentence/'

State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 1996)

(quotations and citation omitted). Put differently, a court abuses its discretion only
when "no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." Id.
(alteration in original); accord State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9,112,84 P.3d 854.
Here, the trial court sentenced Defendant to prison because of his "extensive
criminal history," as well as the fact that he had already served time in prison before
committing these crimes. R. 59: 5-6. Defendant cannot show that no reasonable
person would agree with the trial court's determination. As detailed in the PSI,
Defendant does have an extensive criminal history. On the state level, this includes
multiple convictions for simple assault, multiple convictions for disorderly conduct,
and individual convictions for public intoxication, theft, criminal mischief, and retail
theft. PSI: 5-7. On the federal level, this includes a conviction for unlawfully
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possessing a firearm. PSI: 6-7, And on the interstate level, this includes two
pending drug charges in Montana. PSI: 6-7.
It is also undisputed that Defendant served time in prison before committing
the offenses at issue here. While Defendant disputed the nature of his federal
probation violation, he has never disputed that he served 21 months in federal
prison before committing these offenses. PSI: 8.
Given Defendant's extensive criminal history, as well as the fact that he
remained willing to commit new crimes even after serving time in a federal prison,
there was nothing "inherently unfair" or "clearly excessive" about the trial court's
decision to order prison in this case. Montoya, 929 P.2d at 358.
In response, Defendant first claims that the trial court violated its obligation to
allow him "the opportunity to present mitigating evidence." Aplt. Br. 11-12.
Defendant acknowledges that this claim is unpreserved, but asks this Court to
reverse for either plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. Aplt. Br. 2,13-16.
To establish plain error, an appellant "must show the following: (i) [a]n error
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208-09 (Utah 1993). To
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant
8

"must show: (1) that counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) a
reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient conduct defendant would
have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, %6,89
P.3d 162 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). When an
ineffective assistance claim is based on a failure to file a particular motion, the claim
fails if the motion would have been futile. See State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, f 26,1 P.3d
546; State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f 34,989 P.2d 52.
In this case, regardless of whether addressed under plain error or ineffective
assistance, Defendant's claim fails because Defendant has not shown that the trial
court committed any error.
Contrary to Defendant's claim, the trial court did allow Defendant to present
mitigating evidence. At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the trial court offered
to allow Defendant to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial, but Defendant
rejected that offer. Then, before sentencing Defendant, the trial court allowed
Defendant and his counsel to repeatedly address the court regarding the
appropriate sentence. R. 59:2,6-8,10-11. Defendant points to no evidence that the
trial court prevented him from offering.
Defendant next argues that the trial court violated its obligation under State v.
Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), to give "adequate weight" to certain mitigating
9

factors. Aplt. Br. 8-9. But this Court "has repeatedly rejected the application of the
Galli factors outside of cases involving consecutive sentences. Because consecutive
sentencing is not at issue here, the statutory factors analyzed in Galli do not apply
and are therefore not legally relevant/7 State v. Moreau, 2011 UT App 109, ^f 8, Utah Adv. Rep. --.
Finally, Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion because it
stated "at the outset" that, in its view, Defendant's extensive criminal history
warranted imprisonment. Aplt. Br. 14. This was not an abuse of discretion.
A "sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in light
of his background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society
which underlie the criminal justice system." State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729
(Utah 1980). In making this assessment, a trial court is entitled to consider the
"character and history of the defendant" when determining the appropriate
sentence. Patience, 944 P.2d at 389. Moreover, the "exercise of discretion in
sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court." Moreau, 2011 UT
App 109, f 6 (quotations and citation omitted).
While Defendant may have believed that other factors warranted a different
sentence, no law required the trial court to agree with Defendant's assessment. To
the contrary, it settled that when making a sentencing decision, a trial court is
10

entitled to conclude that "[o]ne factor in mitigation or aggravation" "weigh[s] more
than several factors on the opposite scale/' State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188,192 (Utah
1990); see also State v. Williams, 2006 UT App 420, f 31,147 P.3d 497.
Here, the trial court did nothing more than express its view that a person who
has already been convicted of ten different crimes spanning six different incidents,
and who had already served time in federal prison before committing the multiple
criminal offenses at issue here, belongs in prison. This was an appropriate
conclusion. More importantly, while the judge did express his opinion at the outset,
he allowed Defendant and his counsel to both try to change his mind. R. 59: 5-11.
After hearing their arguments, however, the judge stated that he still thought that
his "decision earlier is the right one/' R. 59:11.
Thus, the record does not show that the trial court refused to consider
Defendant's arguments. Rather, the record shows that the court did consider
Defendant's arguments, but simply found them unpersuasive in light of
Defendant's undisputed criminal record. This was not an abuse of discretion.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant was sentenced to prison because his long criminal history, coupled
with the crimes at issue here, warranted it. Defendant has not shown that no
reasonable person would take that view. Defendant's sentence should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted June Z Z 2011.
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